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Abstract
We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a
continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maxi-
mizes social welfare. In particular, we show that the social welfare optimization can be solved in separate
optimizations conducted on the time-scales relevant to the search platform and advertisers. Here, on each
search occurrence, the platform solves an assignment problem and, on a slower time-scale, each advertiser
submits a bid which matches its demand for click-throughs with supply. Importantly, knowledge of global
parameters, such as the distribution of search terms, is not required when separating the problem in this way.
Exploiting the information asymmetry between the platform and advertiser, we describe a simple mechanism
which incentivizes truthful bidding and has a unique Nash equilibrium that is socially optimal, and thus
implements our decomposition. Further, we consider models where advertisers adapt their bids smoothly
over time, and prove convergence to the solution that maximizes social welfare. Finally, we describe several
extensions which illustrate the flexibility and tractability of our framework.
1 Introduction
Ad-auctions lie at the heart of search markets and generate billions of dollars in revenue for platforms such as
Bing and Google. Sponsored search auctions provide a distributed mechanism where advertisers compete for
their adverts to be shown to users of the search platform, by bidding on search terms associated with queries.
The earliest search auction1 required that advertisers bid a separate price to place an advert in each position
on the search page. This design was soon abandoned for one where an advertiser simply bid an amount per
click: this amount was converted to adjusted bids for each position by multiplication by the platform’s estimate
of click-through probabilities; the highest adjusted bid won the first position, the second-highest the second
position, and so on, with payments only made when an advert was clicked. The shift from an advertiser making
a separate bid for each position to the advertiser making a single bid and being charged per click is an example
of conflation (Milgrom (2010)): advertisers are required to make the same bid per click whatever the position
of the advert.
The design used to assign adverts to positions on the page and the rules used to determine payments have
changed several times, with platforms such as BingAds or Google AdWords using variants of the generalised
second-price auction (GSP) to determine the price per click: under GSP the amount an advertiser pays when
its advert is actually clicked is the smallest price per click that, if bid, would have won the same advert
position (Varian (2007); Edelman et al. (2007)).
In current auctions a fundamental information asymmetry between the platform and advertisers has emerged,
in that the platform typically knows more than an advertiser about the search being conducted. For example,
information on the user conducting the search may comprise location, previous search history, or personal
information provided by the user on sign-in to a platform, any of which may affect click-through probabilities.
The keyword and additional query information all vary randomly with a distribution that is, in principle,
unknown to the platform and advertisers. However, the platform can choose prices and an allocation of adverts
to positions using the platform’s additional information. In contrast to the platform, the advertiser has to rely
on more coarse-grained information, perhaps just the keywords of a query together with a crude categorization
of the user. At best an advertiser sees censored information conditional on her advert being shown and clicked:
the advertiser has no information about auctions where her advert was either not shown (a losing auction for
her) or not clicked, unless the platform chooses to reveal such information.
Variability in the platform’s additional information creates additional variability in the observations available
to the advertiser. It is difficult for the advertiser to view consecutive allocations by the platform as repeated
1initiated in 1998 by GoTo.com, which later became Overture and then part of Yahoo!
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instances of the same auction since, even if the keyword and range of competitors stay the same, the platform’s
additional information varies from search to search. For example, two different searchers for the same keyword
may have very different preferences for adverts, giving different click-through probabilities and thus different
auctions. These auctions are conflated, with the same bid from an advertiser used in each of them, and
this conflation is additional to the conflation over positions. The observations available to the advertiser are
inherently stochastic, with the probability of a click-through fluctuating from search to search, and need to
be filtered in order to estimate click-through rates. Thus the information asymmetry between platform and
advertisers induces a temporal asymmetry: the platform observes each search as it happens, whereas the
advertiser has to rely on delayed and aggregated feedback. At the time of writing, platforms typically provide
delayed feedback to the advertiser on quantities such as number of impressions (i.e., appearances), average
position, average cost per click and so on, averaged over some interval of time.
In this paper we develop a framework to address the information and temporal asymmetries directly. The
framework is described in Section 2 and operates as follows. Each advertiser submits a real-valued bid. Using
the advertisers’ bids and the platform’s estimated click-through probabilities, the platform assigns adverts to
maximize the (expected) bid of an advert receiving a click. This is a classical assignment problem and is solved
with low computational overhead on each search instance. We price adverts with a form of parametrized VCG-
payment: if an advert receives a click-through, then the pricing of that advert requires one further solution
to the assignment problem. We model advertiser i as a utility maximizer, who wants to maximize her payoff
ui(yi) = Ui(yi) − πiyi, where Ui is her private, concave, utility function and where πi and yi are, respectively,
the (average) price she pays per click and the click-through rate she achieves. Under a monotonicity condition
which will be satisfied if the platform’s additional information is sufficiently fine-grained, we prove that the
Nash equilibrium achieved by advertisers maximizes the social welfare of the advertisers. The framework is
extended, in Section 7, to allow an advertiser to make different bids for different keywords or categories of user.
Optimization frameworks of this form are well-established in the communication network community, where
users, the network and its components must be separated. There the phrase “Network Utility Maximiza-
tion” has been coined, but this framework has only recently found its way into Mechanism Design (see
Maheswaran and Basar (2004), Yang and Hajek (2007) and Johari and Tsitsiklis (2009)). By contrast, much of
the existing literature on sponsored search has needed to restrict attention to an isolated instance of an auction
(a single query, repeated without variation) to make progress. We focus upon the stream of search queries:
their randomness and the resulting information asymmetry is an intrinsic aspect of our framework.
Implementation of a Nash equilibrium in the economics literature is typically based on the assumption of
complete information. In the context of sponsored search, where an advertiser is bidding in a conflated set of
auctions with little information on users or competitors (see Pin and Key (2011)), the complete information
assumption is not compelling. As Yang and Hajek (2006) discuss in the context of communication networks,
an alternative justification for equilibrium is needed and is available. In Section 5 we consider dynamics and
convergence under adaptive bid updates by advertisers, and show that under smooth updating of bids, bid
trajectories converge to the unique Nash equilibrium.
The mechanism established by our analysis is simple, flexible and implementable. It reduces to the preferred
equilibrium of the generalized second price auction (GSP) described in Varian (2007); Edelman et al. (2007)
in the special case considered there. But GSP requires an ordered layout of interchangeable adverts, and does
not readily adapt to more complex page layouts, such as text rich adverts, adverts of variable size or adverts
incorporating images – each of which are of current and increasing demand for modern online advertisement
platforms. However, the flexibility to compare and price complex assignments is inherent in VCG mechanisms,
and through this, we determine efficient pricing implementations for general page layouts.
It is well known in the economic literature that market clearing prices that equate to marginal utility
will maximize social welfare. However, this does not guarantee that such prices can be implemented on the
relevant time-scales, where adverts are assigned per impression and charged per click, and search-engine-wide
optimization is a highly non-trivial task. Our results show that social welfare can be optimized by a low
complexity mechanism which assigns and prices adverts on the time-scales required for sponsored search.
1.1 Outline
In Section 2, we introduce a model of sponsored search where the platform distributes advertisers’ bids over an
infinitely large collection of keyword auctions. We define an auction mechanism where an assignment problem is
solved for each search occurrence (Section 2.1). We introduce a monotonicity property, requiring click-through
rates to continuously increase with bids. The mechanism’s pricing scheme is defined in Section 2.2. We discuss
three per-click price implementations, two are deterministic and one is randomized.
In Section 3, we discuss the objective of platform-wide efficiency for a collection advertisers with concave
utility functions. We apply a decomposition argument to a social welfare optimization taken over the uncount-
ably infinite set of constraints in our model of sponsored search. The argument is based on techniques from
convex optimization and duality; proofs, complicated by the infinite setting, are mostly relegated to the ap-
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pendix. These preliminaries establish that if advertisers equate bids with their marginal utility and the platform
solves a maximum weighted matching assignment problem for each search instance then social welfare will be
maximized. Crucially, the time-scale and information asymmetry in this decomposition are those relevant to
sponsored search. The advertisers are optimizing over a slower time-scale than the platform, and the platform
uses the submitted bids to solve on-line a form of generalized first price auction.
After these preliminaries, in Section 4 we make the connection with mechanism design and strategic ad-
vertisers. In particular, we find the form of a rebate which incentivizes advertisers to truthfully declare bids
that equate to their marginal utilities. This produces a unique Nash equilibrium which implements our de-
composition, and this is our main result (Theorem 1). By the separability of our optimization, the rebate
can be computed by a simple mechanism requiring a single additional computation, namely the solution of an
assignment problem, for each click-through. Hence assignment and pricing occur per search query and involve
straightforward polynomial-time computations. The platform solves a (primal) assignment problem on a per-
search time-scale; and advertisers maximize their payoffs by solving a dual optimization problem over a longer
time-scale (Proposition 4). Finally we prove the theorem, which essentially follows from strong duality.
Section 5 contains our discussion of dynamics and of convergence to the Nash equilibrium under adaptive
bid updates by advertisers. In Section 6 we allow more complex page layouts and control of the number of
positions displayed (for instance, through reserve prices), and in Section 7 we allow advertisers to make different
bids for different keywords or categories of user. Section 8 discusses the relationship between our results and
earlier work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 The Assignment and Pricing Model
We begin with notation that reflects a sponsored search setting, where a limited set of adverts are shown in
response to users submitting search queries. We let i ∈ I index the finite set of advertisers. Each has an
advert which they wish to be shown on the pages of search results. An advert, when shown, is placed in a slot
l ∈ L. The set of slots is ordered, with the first (lowest ordered) slot representing the top slot. Let τ ∈ T index
the type of a search conducted by a user. The set T is an infinitely large set. The type τ may incorporate
information such as the keywords, location, previous search history, and any other information the platform has
on the search or searcher. As τ varies, features – such as the keyword – are allowed to change. Let pτil be the
probability of a click-through on advert i if is shown in slot l: this probability is estimated by the platform and
will depend on the type τ .
Over time, a large number of searches from the set T are made. We assume these occur with distribution
Pτ . Thus we view the click-through probability pil : T → [0, 1] as a random variable defined on the type space
T and with distribution Pτ . For example, the random variables p = (pil : i ∈ I, l ∈ L) might admit a joint
probability density function f(p). So, for z = (zil : i ∈ I, l ∈ L) ∈ [0, 1]
I×L,
Pτ (p ≤ z) =
∫
[0,1]I×L
I[p ≤ z]f(p)dp.
Here I is the indicator function and vector inequalities, e.g., p ≤ z, are taken componentwise, pil ≤ zil ∀i ∈
I, l ∈ L.
We exploit the inherent randomness in pil for the optimal placement of adverts. We assume that the platform
has access to the information about the query captured in τ , and so can successfully predict the click-through
probability pτil, whilst the advertiser does not have access to such fine-grained search information. Later, in
Sections 4 and 5, we shall see that the platform can use this information asymmetry to guide the auction system
towards an optimal outcome.
2.1 Assignment Model
Next we describe a mechanism by which the platform assigns adverts. Suppose advertiser i submits a bid bi,
which reflects what the advertiser is willing to pay for a click-through. The bid bi is a non-negative real number.
Later, in Section 7, we shall allow an advertiser to submit different bids for different categories of search type,
for example for different keywords.
Let b = (bi, i ∈ I). Given the information (τ, b), the following optimization maximizes the expected sum of
bids on click-throughs from a single search.
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ASSIGNMENT(τ, b)
Maximize
∑
i∈I
bi
∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il (2.1a)
subject to
∑
i∈I
xτil ≤ 1, l ∈ L, (2.1b)
∑
l∈L
xτil ≤ 1, i ∈ I, (2.1c)
over xτil ≥ 0, i ∈ I, l ∈ L. (2.1d)
The above optimization is an assignment problem, where the constraint (2.1b) prevents a slot containing
more than one advert, and the constraint (2.1c) prevents any single advert being shown more than once on a
search page. The assignment problem is highly appealing from a computational perspective, firstly, because an
integral solution can be found efficiently (see Kuhn (1955); Bertsekas (1988)) and, secondly, because there is no
need to pre-compute the assignment. The assignment problem can be solved on each occurrence of a search of
type τ ∈ T , and an integral solution forms a maximum weighted matching of advertisers I with slots L.
We apply the convention that if bi = 0 then x
τ
il = 0 for l ∈ L, so that a zero bid does not receive clicks. Let
yτi =
∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il, yi = Eτy
τ
i . (2.2)
The solution xτ to the assignment problem (2.1) may not be unique: however the solution will be unique with
probability one if, for example, the distribution of click-through probabilities p admits a density. We make the
milder assumption that (yτi , i ∈ I) is unique with probability one.
Note that yτi is the click-through rate for advertiser i from a given search page, and yi is the click-through
rate averaged over T . (We shall not use yi for the random variable y
τ
i .) In our model the information asymmetry
between the platform and advertiser is captured by the search type τ which is known to the platform but not to
the advertiser: thus we assume that yτi is known to the platform, from its solution to the assignment problem,
while only the average yi is reported to, or accessible for estimation by, advertiser i. For an optimal solution to
the above assignment problem, write yτi = y
τ
i (b) to emphasize the dependence of y
τ
i on the vector of bids b and,
similarly, write yi = yi(b). Let (b
′
i, b−i) be the vector obtained from b by replacing the ith component by b
′
i.
We shall assume the following monotonicity property of solutions of ASSIGNMENT(τ, b). We assume that
yi(bi, b−i) takes the value 0 when bi = 0, and is strictly increasing in bi and continuous in (bi, b−i) whenever any
component of b−i is positive. Without the monotonicity property yi(b) will be increasing in bi but may not be
strictly increasing or continuous. A similar assumption has been made by Nekipelov et al. (2015), who argue
that the assumption is natural and satisfied by the sponsored search data they analyze.
The monotonicity property will generally follow from sufficient variability of click-through rates. For instance,
a sufficient condition is that the random variables p admit a continuous density f(p) on the set of click-through
probabilities P˜ = {p ∈ [0, 1]|I|×|L| : pil ≥ pik, l < k} which is positive on a neighborhood containing the origin.
Observe that on P˜ the click-through probability for a given advert increases as the slot it is shown in decreases.
The following result establishes the monotonicity property under the above sufficient condition.
Proposition 1. If the distribution Pτ admits a continuous probability density function on P˜ which is positive
on a neighborhood containing the origin then the mapping bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) satisfies the monotonicity property.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. The sufficient condition of Proposition 1 is far from
necessary, as we shall illustrate later in Example 1. Our earlier assumption that (yτi , i ∈ I) is unique with
probability one is implied by the monotonicity property.
2.2 Pricing Model
Once adverts are allocated, prices must be determined for any resulting click-throughs. We consider a mechanism
where the expected rate of payment by advertiser i is
πi(b)yi(b) =
∫ bi
0
(
yi(b)− yi(b
′
i, b−i)
)
db′i. (2.3)
Here, as before, b = (bi : i ∈ I) is the vector of advertisers’ bids and yi(b) is the resulting click-through rate
for advertiser i. We discuss later the rationale for this formula in the proper context of mechanism design, in
Section 4. For now we note that the rate of payment (2.3) can be readily implemented by the platform at a
low computational cost. We give three examples of implementations: the first uses randomization to estimate
the integral (2.3); the second is a form of VCG price; and the third uses the solution of a linear program due
to Leonard (1983). The first two require the solution of just one additional instance of the assignment problem
per click-through.
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A randomized price.
Suppose the platform solves ASSIGNMENT(τ, b), and observes a click-through on (i, l) — that is the solution has
xτil = 1, and the user clicks on the advert in position l, which is for advertiser i. To price this advert, the platform
chooses b′i uniformly and randomly on the interval (0, bi) and additionally solves ASSIGNMENT(τ, (b
′
i, b−i)).
Let yτi (b
′
i, b−i) =
∑
l∈L p
τ
ilx
τ
il under a solution to this problem. The platform then charges advertiser i an
amount
bi
(
1−
yτi (b
′
i, b−i)
yτi (b)
)
(2.4)
for the click-through. This charge does not depend on the distribution Pτ , and will lie between 0 and bi. Taking
expectations over τ and b′i shows that the expected rate of payment by advertiser i is
Eτ,b′
i
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
ilbi
(
1−
yτi (b
′
i, b−i)
yτi (b)
)]
= bi
(
yi(b)− Eb′
i
[yi(b
′
i, b−i)]
)
=
∫ bi
0
(
yi(b)− yi(b
′
i, b−i)
)
db′i,
recovering expression (2.3).
Observe that the additional instance of the assignment problem does not determine the assignment, and thus
will not slow down the page impression: rather, it is used to calculate the charge (2.4) for a click-through. Indeed,
one could imagine a charge bi on the click-through, followed by a later rebate of a proportion y
τ
i (b
′
i, b−i)/y
τ
i (b)
of the charge. The rebate depends on the uniform random variable b′i as well as the random variable τ : next
we shall see that we can remove the dependence on b′i.
A parametrized VCG price.
Note that ∫ bi
0
yi(b
′
i, b−i)db
′
i =
∑
j
bjyj(b)−
∑
j 6=i
bjyj(0, b−i),
since both expressions share the same derivative with respect to bi (see Proposition 2 of Appendix A) and both
expressions take the value 0 when bi = 0. Thus the rate of payment (2.3) can be implemented by a charge bi
on a click-through followed by a later rebate
1
yτi (b)
(∑
j
bjy
τ
j (b)−
∑
j 6=i
bjy
τ
j (0, b−i)
)
. (2.5)
The rebate calculation again requires the solution of one additional instance of the assignment problem, this
time omitting advertiser i. This calculation is familiar as the VCG mechanism when the utility function for
advertiser j, j ∈ I, is replaced by the surrogate linear utility bjyj . The charge minus the rebate has the usual
VCG interpretation as the externality caused by advertiser i, but under these surrogate utilities.
Computing all prices simultaneously.
Leonard (1983) has shown that VCG prices in assignment games are a minimal solution to a dual assignment
problem, and this allows prices for all potential click-throughs to be calculated from the solution to just one
optimization problem.
Let Aτ be the maximal value achieved by the objective function (2.1a) in the assignment problem (2.1).
Then per-impression VCG prices are given by the solution vτ , sτ to the following optimization problem.
Minimize
∑
l∈L
vl
subject to
∑
i∈I
si +
∑
l∈L
vl = A
τ ,
si + vl ≥ bip
τ
il, i ∈ I, l ∈ L,
over si ≥ 0, vl ≥ 0, i ∈ I, l ∈ L.
An initial feasible solution to this dual assignment program is given by the dual variables corresponding to an
optimum of the assignment problem (2.1) and techniques for its solution are reviewed in Bikhchandani et al.
(2002).
This formulation allows for either pay-per-click or pay-per-impression pricing of adverts. After solving the
problem for vτ , sτ , advertiser i can either be charged the price vτl for an impression of her advert in slot l or be
charged the price vτl /p
τ
il = bi− s
τ
i /p
τ
il on a click-through: in the latter case the result of Leonard (1983) implies
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that the rebate sτi /p
τ
il will equal expression (2.5). Observe that the dual assignment problem to be solved is
identical whichever advert is clicked on.
We end this section with a setting where particularly simple closed forms are available for prices.
Example 1. If there is a single slot then the slot will be assigned to the bidder i with the highest value of bip
τ
i1,
and if this results in a click-through then the charge will be maxj 6=i bjp
τ
j1 / p
τ
i1, a second price auction on the
products bjp
τ
j1.
Suppose next there are L slots with I advertisers bidding and further suppose that the click-through proba-
bilities take the form pτil = q
τ
i pl where p1 > p2 > . . . > pL. Here pl is a slot effect, and q
τ
i is an advertiser
effect which may depend on the search query (for example, it may depend on some measure of distance between
the searcher and the advertiser). Define the search-adjusted bid bτi = biq
τ
i and, given τ , order the advertisers so
that bτ1 > b
τ
2 > . . . > b
τ
I . Then advertisers 1, 2, . . . ,min{L, I} are allocated slots 1, 2, . . . ,min{L, I} respectively.
If necessary ties can be broken randomly.
In this example it is straightforward to calculate the expected value of expression (2.4) over b′i explicitly. Set
pL+1 = 0 and bi = b
τ
i = 0 for i > I. Upon a click-through on slot l advertiser l is charged the amount π
τ
l where
πτl q
τ
l = b
τ
l+1 −
1
pl
L∑
m=l+1
pm(b
τ
m − b
τ
m+1), l = 1, 2, . . . , L.
Expressed as a recursion this implies
πτl =
qτl+1
qτl
(
bl+1 −
pl+1
pl
(bl+1 − π
τ
l+1)
)
, l = 1, 2, . . . , L (2.6)
recovering an equilibrium of the generalized second price auction, Edelman et al. (2007). Note, however, that
the charges (2.6), and indeed the slots allocated, fluctuate with the search type τ . The expected revenue, given
τ , is
L∑
m=1
πτmq
τ
mpm =
L∑
m=1
(pm − pm+1)bm+1q
τ
m+1. (2.7)
In the model considered by Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) the random variables (qτi , i ∈ I) are all
in fact constants, and in this case there may be multiple Nash equilibria. For example, suppose L = I = 2: then
for either one of the advertisers to bid very high and the other to bid very low is a Nash equilibrium. We shall
see in following sections that provided our monotonicity condition is satisfied there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
The restriction that click-through probabilities have the product-form pτil = q
τ
i pl implies they lie in a linear
subspace of P˜: thus they do not have a density over P˜, and so we cannot appeal to Proposition 1 to justify the
monotonicity property, in particular that yi(b) is a strictly increasing and continuous function of bi. But if the
advertiser effects (qτi , i ∈ I) have a continuous probability density positive on a neighbourhood of the origin in
{q ∈ [0, 1]|I|} then the monotonicity property will follow. Essentially the variability of the advertiser effect qτi
smooths out the impact of the bid bi sufficiently that the rate yi(bi, b−i) is continuous in bi.
3 Optimization Preliminaries
In this section we present an optimization problem which we use to develop various decomposition and duality
results. In particular, we find that if advertisers equate bids with their marginal utility and the platform
solves a maximum weighted matching assignment problem for each search instance, then social welfare will be
maximized.
We suppose each advertiser i has a utility function, yi 7→ Ui(yi), where Ui(·) is non-negative, increasing,
strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Our objective is to place adverts so as to maximize the sum of
these utilities, in other words to maximize social welfare. To simplify the statement of results we shall assume
further that U ′i(yi)→∞ as yi ↓ 0 and U
′
i(yi)→ 0 as yi ↑ ∞. The maximization of social welfare by the auction
system is the following problem.
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SYSTEM(U , I, Pτ )
Maximize
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi) (3.1a)
subject to yi = Eτ
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il
]
, i ∈ I, (3.1b)
∑
i∈I
xτil ≤ 1, l ∈ L, τ ∈ T , (3.1c)
∑
l∈L
xτil ≤ 1, i ∈ I, τ ∈ T , (3.1d)
over xτil ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0 i ∈ I, l ∈ L. (3.1e)
Inequalities (3.1c) and (3.1d) are just the scheduling constraints (2.1b) and (2.1c), that each slot can show
at most one advert and that each advertiser can show at most one advert, while equality (3.1b) recaps the
definition (2.2) of yi, the expected click-through rate. Over these constraints we maximize social welfare, i.e.,
the aggregate sum of the utilities.
To solve the above optimization, one could imagine that there is a centralized designer who knows everything
about the entire system: the advertisers’ utilities Ui(·), i ∈ I, click-through probabilities p
τ
il, i ∈ I, l ∈ L, τ ∈ T ,
and the distribution Pτ over these probabilities. This designer then attempts to assign adverts in a way so
that yi, i ∈ I, the click-through rates received by advertisers, maximize social welfare. The solution of such an
optimization by centralized means is not possible — for example, the utilities will not be known — but the
form of the solution will help us develop an appropriate decomposition, respecting the time-scales relevant to
the platform and advertisers. In the next section, on mechanism design, we consider the game theoretic aspects
that arise when, instead of a single system optimizer, the platform and advertisers have differing information
and incentives.
Incorporating the constraint (3.1b) into the objective function (3.1a) gives the Lagrangian
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi) +
∑
i∈I
biEτ
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il − yi
]
,
where bi, i ∈ I are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (3.1b), with bi ≥ 0. Notice, we
intentionally omit the scheduling constraints from our Lagrangian. Thus we seek to maximize the Lagrangian
subject to the constraints (3.1c-3.1d) as well as (3.1e). Let S be the set of variables xτ = (xτil : i ∈ I, l ∈ L)
satisfying the assignment constraints (2.1b-2.1d), and let A be the set of variables x = (xτ ∈ S : τ ∈ T )
satisfying the assignment constraints (3.1c-3.1e). We see that our Lagrangian problem is separable in the
following sense
max
x∈A,y≥0
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− biyi} (3.2a)
+ Eτ
[
max
xτ∈S
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il
]
. (3.2b)
Define
U∗i (bi) = max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− biyi} . (3.3)
The optimization over yi contained in the definition (3.3) would arise if advertiser i were presented with a fixed
price per click-through of bi: if allowed to choose freely her click-through rate, she would then choose yi such
that U ′i(yi) = bi. By our assumptions on Ui(·), this equation has a unique solution for all bi ∈ (0,∞). Call
Di(ξ) = {U
′
i}
−1(ξ) the demand of advertiser i at price ξ. It follows that U∗i (bi) can be written in the form
U∗i (bi) =
∫ ∞
bi
Di(ξ)dξ; (3.4)
call this advertiser i’s consumer surplus at the price bi. From this expression we can deduce that U
∗
i (bi) is
positive, decreasing, strictly convex and continuously differentiable.
Observe that the maximization inside the expectation (3.2b) is simply the problem ASSIGNMENT(τ, b),
and thus we can write
max
x∈A,y≥0
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
U∗i (bi) +
∑
i∈I
biyi(b).
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The Lagrangian dual of the SYSTEM problem (3.1) can thus be written as follows.
DUAL(U∗,y, I)
Minimize
∑
i∈I
(U∗i (bi) + biyi(b)) (3.5a)
over bi ≥ 0, i ∈ I. (3.5b)
Owing to the size of the type space T , the optimization (3.1) has a potentially uncountable number of constraints.
This presents certain technical difficulties, for instance those associated with proving strong duality. These issues
are dealt with in the appendix, where the proofs of the following two propositions are presented.
We first observe that the SYSTEM problem decomposes into optimizations relevant to the advertisers and
to the platform.
Proposition 2 (Decomposition). Variables y˜, x˜τ , τ ∈ T , satisfying the feasibility conditions (3.1b-3.1e) are
optimal for SYSTEM(U ,I,Pτ ) if and only if there exist b˜i, i ∈ I, such that
A. b˜i minimizes U
∗
i (bi) + biy˜i over bi ≥ 0, for each i ∈ I,
B. x˜τ solves ASSIGNMENT(τ, b˜) with probability one under the distribution Pτ over τ ∈ T .
In this proposition, the optimization in Condition A does not naturally correspond to the bidding behavior of
strategic advertisers, at least in its present form. Hence we need to examine the implications of Condition A for
the construction of prices (2.3) that do give strategic advertisers the incentive to solve the SYSTEM problem.
We do this in the next section, Section 4. There we shall also see that the per-click pricing implementations
(2.4) and (2.5) are made possible by the decomposition into per-impression assignments, Condition B.
The optimal bids b˜ can be further understood through the following dual characterization.
Proposition 3 (Dual Optimality).
a) The objective of the dual problem (3.5) is continuously differentiable for b > 0 and is minimized uniquely by
the positive vector b˜ = (b˜i : i ∈ I) satisfying, for each i ∈ I,
dU∗i
dbi
(b˜i) + yi(b˜) = 0. (3.6)
b) If b˜ is an optimal solution to the DUAL problem (3.5) then xτ (b˜), y(b˜) are optimal for the SYSTEM problem
(3.1).
The dual provides a finite parameter optimization from which the SYSTEM problem can be solved. More-
over, (3.6) provides conditions on advertiser demands which, to solve the SYSTEM problem, must be effected
by the auction system in strategic form.
4 Mechanism Design
We now prove that our mechanism implements our system optimization. In the last section we demonstrated
how this global problem can be decomposed into two types of sub-problem: one, where the platform finds an
optimal assignment given click-through probabilities; and the other, where the dual variables b are each set
to solve a certain single parameter dual problem. In this section we suppose the advertisers act strategically,
anticipating the result of the platform’s assignment and attempting to maximize their payoff.
Henceforth bi is the bid submitted by advertiser i and, as a function of these bids, we formulate prices that
incentivize the advertisers to choose bids that result in an assignment that solves the SYSTEM problem (3.1).
Consider a mechanism where, given the vector of bids b = (bi : i ∈ I), each advertiser, i, receives a click-
through rate yi(b), and from this derives a benefit Ui(yi(b)) and is charged an expected price πi(b) per click.
The payoff to advertiser i arising from a vector of bids b = (bi : i ∈ I) is then
ui(b) = Ui(yi(b))− πi(b)yi(b). (4.1)
A Nash equilibrium is a vector of bids b∗ = (b∗i : i ∈ I) such that, for i ∈ I and all bi
ui(b
∗) ≥ ui(bi, b
∗
−i). (4.2)
Here (bi, b
∗
−i) is obtained from the vector b
∗ by replacing the ith component by bi.
The main result of this section is the following.
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Theorem 1. If prices are charged so that the expected rate of payment by advertiser i, for i ∈ I, is given
by expression (2.3) then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and it is given by the vector of optimal prices
identified in Proposition 3. Thus the assignments achieved at the Nash equilibrium, xτ (b∗), y(b∗), form a solution
to the SYSTEM problem (3.1).
The result states that, given adverts are assigned according to the assignment problem (2.1), the game
theoretic equilibrium reached by advertisers attempting to maximize their respective payoffs ui solves the
problem SYSTEM(U ,I,Pτ ). Since yi(b
′
i, b−i) is a strictly increasing function of the bid b
′
i, it follows from (2.3)
that the price πi(b) must be strictly lower than the bid bi. Setting a price lower than the submitted bid is a
prevalent feature of online auctions used by search engines, and, as we emphasized in Section 2, the prices (2.3)
can be practically implemented in a sponsored search setting.
We note that, in this section, each advertiser expresses their preferences through a single bid. This framework
extends naturally to the case where advertisers place multiple bids over multiple different keywords (or search
categories). This extension is given in Section 7.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To establish Theorem 1 we will require an additional result, Proposition 4, which indicates how maximal payoffs
achieved by each advertiser relate to the solution of the dual problem, given by Proposition 3 from the previous
section.
Proposition 4 (Mechanism Dual). For each positive choice of b−i = (bj : j 6= i, j ∈ I), the following equality
holds
max
bi≥0
ui(b) = min
bi≥0
{
U∗i (bi) +
∫ bi
0
yi(b
′
i, b−i)db
′
i
}
. (4.3)
Moreover, the optimizing bi for both expressions is the same, is unique and finite, and satisfies
d
dbi
U∗i (bi) + yi(b) = 0. (4.4)
Proof. We calculate the conjugate dual of the payoff function (4.1). Let Pi(yi) be the function whose Legendre-
Fenchel transform is
P ∗i (bi) =
∫ bi
0
yi(b
′
i, b−i)db
′
i.
The above function is increasing and convex, and we know from Fenchel’s Duality Theorem (Borwein and Lewis,
2006, Theorem 3.3.5) that
max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− Pi(yi)} = min
bi≥0
{U∗i (bi) + P
∗
i (bi)} . (4.5)
Next we calculate the function Pi from the dual of the function P
∗
i above. By the Fenchel–Moreau Theorem,
Borwein and Lewis (2006), we know this to be
Pi(yi) = min
bi≥0
{
biyi −
∫ bi
0
yi(b
′
i, b−i)db
′
i
}
.
The optimum in this expression occurs when yi(b) = yi. Substituting this back, since bi 7→ yi(b) is strictly
increasing, we have that
Pi(yi) =
∫ ∞
0
(yi − yi(b
′
i, b−i)) I[yi(b
′
i, b−i) ≤ yi]db
′
i. (4.6)
In other words, as expected with the Legendre-Fenchel transform, the area under the curve yi(bi, b−i) is converted
to the area to the left of the curve yi(bi, b−i). Further, notice, if yi > maxbi yi(bi, b−i) then Pi(yi) = ∞, and
thus the finite range of the function yi 7→ Pi(yi) is exactly the same as that of bi 7→ Pi(yi(b)). Noting (4.6) and
this last observation, the equality (4.5) now reads
min
bi≥0
{
U∗i (bi) +
∫ bi
0
y(b′i, b−i)db
′
i
}
=max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− Pi(yi)}
=max
bi≥0
{Ui(yi(b))− Pi(yi(b))}
=max
bi≥0
{Ui(yi(b))− πi(b)yi(b)} .
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In the final equality we note from the definition (2.3) that Pi(yi(b)) = πi(b)yi(b). This gives the equality (4.3).
We now show that both expressions (4.3) are determined at the same unique value of bi. The function
U∗i (bi)−P
∗
i (b) is a strictly convex differentiable function of bi, whose unique minimum is given by the required
expression (4.4). Further, bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) is strictly increasing and bi achieves the range of the strictly concave
function Ui(yi) − Pi(yi) under yi = yi(bi, b−i). Thus Ui(yi) − Pi(yi) is maximized uniquely by yi = yi(bi, b−i)
(and thus uniquely by bi) satisfying
d
dyi
Ui(yi(b))− bi = 0. (4.7)
Since d
dbi
U∗i is the inverse of the strictly increasing function
d
dyi
Ui, it is clear that (4.4) and (4.7) are equivalent
and satisfied by the same unique bi. This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows by observing the optimality conditions of Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Theorem 1. Before proceeding with the main argument, we note that a Nash equilibrium must be
achieved by positive values of bi. By applying the mean value theorem, for some y˜ satisfying 0 = yi(0, b−i) ≤
y˜ ≤ yi(bi, b−i), we have
ui(bi, b−i) ≥ Ui(0) + U
′
i(y˜)(yi(bi, b−i)− yi(0, b−i))−
∫ bi
0
(yi(bi, b−i)− yi(0, b−i))db
′
i
= ui(0, b−i) + (U
′
i(y˜)− bi)(yi(bi, b−i)− yi(0, b−i)) (4.8)
> ui(0, b−i).
The second term in (4.8) is positive for bi sufficiently small, since U
′
i(y˜) − bi ր ∞ as bi ց 0 and from our
monotonicity property yi(bi, b−i) > yi(0, b−i). From this we see that a Nash equilibrium can only be achieved
with bi > 0 for each i ∈ I.
By Proposition 4, b = (bi : i ∈ I) > 0 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if condition (4.4) is satisfied for
each i ∈ I. But by Proposition 3b), these conditions hold if and only if b is the unique solution to the dual
to the SYSTEM problem. So, the set of Nash equilibria are the optimal prices defined for the decomposition,
Proposition 2. By Proposition 3b), the assignment achieved by Nash equilibrium bids maximizes the utilitarian
objective SYSTEM(U , I, Pτ ). Finally, by Strong Duality (Theorem 3 of Appendix C), there exists b
∗ which
optimizes the dual problem (3.5), and thus there must be a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1. The optimality condition (3.6) or (4.4) states that each advertiser’s demand, Di(bi), and supply,
yi(b), should equate, and is a consequence of the Envelope Theorem. A more familiar context for this form of
result is Vickrey pricing (Vickrey (1961)) and Myerson’s Lemma (or the Revenue Equivalence Theorem), see
Myerson (1981) and (Milgrom, 2004, Theorem 3.3), which are also consequences of the Envelope Theorem. But
observe that we are using general utilities, which despite the single input parameter bi, takes us out of a single
parameter type space to which Myerson’s Lemma generally applies.
We have assumed throughout the monotonicity property, ensuring that the mapping bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) is
strictly increasing and continuous. A natural question concerns whether the monotonicity property can be
relaxed.
Example 2. If the mapping is discontinuous, there may be inefficient Nash equilibria, and the L = I = 2 case
discussed in Example 1, with two advertisers and two slots, provides an illustration. The same difficulty can
arise even if the mapping is continuous but not strictly increasing, as we now show. Amend the illustration, by
supposing that the advertiser effects qτ1 , q
τ
2 are independent random variables with continuous probability density
functions each supported on the interval (q − ǫ, q + ǫ) for q >> ǫ > 0. The mapping bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) is now
continuous, although not strictly increasing. The inefficient Nash equilibria remain, where one of the advertisers
bids very high and the other very low. If we assume the densities of qτ1 , q
τ
2 are positive in a neighbourhood of
the origin, then the mapping is necessarily strictly increasing, because a small increase in an advertiser’s bid
will have a small but positive probability of improving the slot allocated to the advertiser: competition exists
between the advertisers, whatever their bids, for at least some search types τ , and this ensures the uniqueness
and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium.
5 Dynamics and Convergence
We have seen in Section 2 that our assignment model involves the rapid solution of a computationally straight-
forward problem for each individual search. The challenge facing an advertiser is of a different form: she has
to rely on noisy and possibly delayed feedback averaged over some period of time in order to learn the mean
click-through rate yi that has been achieved by her bid bi, and she then has to decide whether to vary her bid.
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We shall formulate the advertiser’s problem in continuous time, and the natural question is whether multiple
advertisers smoothly varying their bids bi(t) as a consequence of their current click-through rates yi(t) will
converge to the Nash equilibrium.
Convergence may not be possible when the search space is discrete, e.g., for an auction on a single search
type. Essentially, the search engine does not have enough additional information from the search type τ to fine
tune its discrimination between advertisers. However, in sponsored search, there is inherent variability in the
search type τ which will influence the click-through probabilities of the advertiser. This is the motivation for
our assumption of the monotonicity property, that the distribution Pτ over T is such that the click-through rate
yi(b) is a continuous, strictly increasing function of bi. We shall see that, under models of advertiser response,
we are then able to deduce convergence towards a system optimum.
Recall the objective function for the dual of the system problem as derived in Proposition 3,
V(b) =
∑
i∈I
U∗i (bi) +
∑
i∈I
biyi(b). (5.1)
This expression is the sum of the consumer surpluses and the revenue achieved by the platform at prices b and,
when b is optimal, it is equal to the maximal total welfare as defined by the SYSTEM problem (3.1). Further,
V(b) is continuously differentiable for b > 0 with
∂V
∂bi
= −Di(bi) + yi(b).
We next model advertisers’ responses to their observation of click-through rates. We suppose advertiser i
changes her bid bi(t) smoothly (i.e., continuously and differentiably) as a consequence of her observation of her
current click-through rate yi(t) so that
d
dt
bi(t) ≷ 0 according as bi(t) ≶ U
′
i(yi(b(t))). (5.2)
This is a natural dynamical system representation of advertiser i varying bi smoothly in order to improve her
payoff ui(b), given by expression (4.1), under prices (2.3), since under the monotonicity condition a small positive
change in bi will cause a small positive change in yi(b) and the impact on ui(b) will be positive or negative as
in relation (5.2) - see Lemma ?? in Appendix ??. Note that from the definition of the demand function Di(·),
yi ≶ Di(bi) according as bi ≶ U
′
i(yi). (5.3)
The payoff ui(b) is maximized over bi when bi and U
′
i(yi(b)) equate, or equivalently, when yi(b) and Di(bi)
equate.
Theorem 2 (Convergence of Dynamics). Starting from any point b(0) in the interior of the positive orthant,
the trajectory (b(t) : t ≥ 0) of the above dynamical system converges to a solution of the DUAL problem (3.5).
Thus y(b(t)), the assignment achieved by the prices b(t), converges to a solution of the SYSTEM problem (3.1).
Proof. We prove that the objective of the dual problem V(b), defined above, is a Lyapunov function for the
dynamical system. Note that V(b) is continuously differentiable for b > 0. Since yi(b) ↓ 0 as bi ↓ 0 and U
′(0) > 0
it follows from (5.2) that there exists δ > 0, possibly depending on b−i(t), such that
d
dt
bi(t) > 0 if bi(t) ≤ δ. We
deduce that the paths of our dynamical system (b(t) : t ≥ 0) are strictly positive and V(b(t)) is continuously
differentiable along these paths. Further, the level sets {b : V(b) ≤ κ} are compact: this is an immediate
consequence of the facts that the functions U∗i (bi) are positive and decreasing, and, as proven in Lemma 2, that
lim
||b||→∞
∑
i∈I
biyi(b) =∞.
Differentiating V(b(t)) yields
d
dt
V(b(t)) =
∑
i∈I
∂V
∂bi
d
dt
bi(t) = −
∑
i∈I
(Di(bi(t)) − yi(b(t)))
d
dt
bi(t) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from relations (5.2) and (5.3), and is strict unless Di(bi(t)) = yi(b(t)) for i ∈ I. By
Lyapunov’s Stability Theorem, see (Khalil, 2002, Theorem 4.1), the process (b(t) : t ≥ 0) converges to the set
of points b∗ satisfying, for i ∈ I, Di(bi) = yi(b). Recall that
dU∗i
dbi
= −Di(bi) and thus, by Proposition 3(a), the
price process b(t) converges to an optimal solution to the dual problem (3.5). By the monotonicity property
y(b) is continuous, and thus by Proposition 3(b) the click-through rates y(b(t)) converge to an optimal solution
for the system problem.
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In the above discussion we model advertisers that smoothly change their bids over time. However, we remark
that other convergence mechanisms could be considered. For instance, since our dual optimization problem is
convex and continuously differentiable, we can minimize the dual through a coordinate descent algorithm, where
each component bi is sequentially minimized. Such an algorithm could correspond to a game played sequentially
with advertisers iteratively maximizing over bi their payoff ui(bi, b−i). Previous work on global convergence to a
Nash equilibrium using an assumption of local rather than complete information is described by Yang and Hajek
(2006).
The dynamical system of this section allows advertisers’ bids to adapt to a non-stationary environment,
for example if the set of participating advertisers changes. Note that we have left unexplored the statistical
aspects of estimating the click-through rates yi, although some insights are available from the network utility
maximization framework for communication networks (Kelly (2003)). In particular, if the period of time over
which the click-through rates yi are estimated is longer then this will improve the statistical accuracy of the
estimation, but will also slow down the rate of adaptation to a changing environment; and even in a stationary
environment there is necessarily a trade-off between the speed of convergence to, and the stochastic variability
around, the system optimum.
Remark 2. We have assumed Ui(·) is non-negative, increasing and strictly concave, and is continuously dif-
ferentiable with boundary conditions U ′i(yi)→∞ as yi ↓ 0 and U
′
i(yi)→ 0 as yi ↑ ∞. The boundary conditions
have simplified the statement of results, but are not critical. If we assume only that Ui(·) is increasing, strictly
concave, and continuously differentiable with U ′i(0) < U
′
i(∞) then the Lyapunov function (5.1) remains strictly
convex on the domain {b : U ′i(∞) < bi < U
′
i(0), i ∈ I}, has an interior minimum, and starting from any point
b(0) in this domain the trajectory (b(t) : t ≥ 0) converges to the point b achieving this minimum, which is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
6 General Assignments
In this section we consider how the assignment problem (2.1) can be generalized within our framework. Some
extensions are immediate and straightforward. For example, we could allow the number of slots L = L(τ) to
depend on the search type τ ; the pricing implementations of Section 2.2 do not require L(τ) to be constant over
τ . In this Section we consider two further generalizations of practical importance.
6.1 More complex page layouts
Suppose the platform allows adverts of different sizes: for example, an advertiser may wish to offer an advert
that occupies two adjacent slots. More generally adverts may vary in size, position, and include images and
other media. So the platform may have a more complex set of possible page layouts than simply an ordered
list of slots 1, 2, . . . , L. Let l ∈ L describe a possible layout of the adverts for advertisers i ∈ I. Let pτil be
the probability of a click-through to advertiser i under layout l. Then the generalization of the assignment
problem (2.1) becomes
Maximize
∑
i∈I
bip
τ
il
over l ∈ L.
Indeed, this formulation allows the click-through probabilities for an advert to depend not just on the advertiser
and the position within the page, but also on which other adverts are shown on the page, provided only the
probabilities pτil can be estimated.
The complexity of this optimization problem depends on the design of the page layout through the structure
of the set L and may depend on any structural information on the probabilities pτil, but for a variety of cases
it will remain an assignment problem with an efficient solution. If yi(b) is again defined as the expected click-
through rate for advertiser i from a bid vector b, and if it satisfies the monotonicity property, then Theorems 1
and 2 hold with identical proofs.
Example 3. In an image-text auction, the platform may place on a page either an ordered set of text adverts (as
described in Section 2) or a single image advert. As before advertiser i bids bi, the marginal utility to advertiser
i of an additional click-through; and now we suppose advertisers i ∈ Itext make available text adverts and
advertisers i ∈ Iimage make available image adverts, where I = Itext∪Iimage and an advertiser i ∈ Itext∩Iimage
makes available both a text and an image advert. Let the click-through probability on image advert i be pτi for
i ∈ Iimage, with click-through probabilities on text adverts as in Section 2.
For this example the assignment problem is straightforward: the platform solves the earlier assignment prob-
lem (2.1) over advertisers i ∈ Itext, and shows text adverts if the optimum achieved exceeds maxi∈Iimage bip
τ
i
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and otherwise shows an image achieving this latter maximum. Similarly the calculation of the rebate is straight-
forward, with one further assignment problem to be solved for each click-through.
It is of course possible to construct assignment problems that are not as straightforward. For example,
suppose that adverts are of different sizes, and the platform has a bound on the sum of the advert sizes shown.
The assignment problem then includes as a special case the knapsack problem. In general the problem is NP-hard
but it becomes computationally feasible if, for example, there are a limited number of possible advert sizes, as in
the image-text auction above.
6.2 Controlling the number of slots
The platform may wish to limit the number of slots filled, if it judges the available adverts as not sufficiently
interesting to searchers. Ultimately showing the wrong or poor quality adverts can cause searchers to move
platform and so hurt long-term platform revenue.
Suppose the platform judges there is a benefit (positive or negative) qτil to a searcher for an impression of
the advert from advertiser i in slot l for a search of type τ , regardless of whether or not the searcher clicks on
the advert. The system objective function (3.1a) then becomes
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi) + Eτ
[∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
qτilx
τ
il
]
,
the assignment objective function (2.1a) becomes∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
(bip
τ
il + q
τ
il)x
τ
il,
and our results hold with minor amendments. In particular, equation (2.3) for the price function and equa-
tion (5.1) for the Lyapunov function are unaltered, although of course the functions yi(b) will now be defined
in terms of solutions to the new assignment problem.
An important special case occurs when qτil ≡ −R, where R is a reserve price, but in this case we need to
slightly perturb the set-up to ensure that Proposition 1 remains sufficient for the monotonicity property. Suppose
that qτil = q
τ for all i ∈ I, l ∈ L where qτ = 0 or −R with probabilities ǫ and 1 − ǫ respectively. (Formally,
augment the space T to carry a random variable qτ that is independent of the click-through probabilities pτil.)
Then with probability 1− ǫ an advert will be shown in a slot only if its contribution to the objective function of
the assignment problem, bip
τ
il, is at least R. With probability ǫ a reserve is not applied: we add the possibility
to ensure yi(b) is increasing even for small bi.
Of course a reserveRmay also have a favourable effect on the revenue received by the platform, Ostrovsky and Schwarz
(2011); Bachrach et al. (2014). As an illustration, consider the generalized second price auction of Example 1.
A reserve of R will reduce the number of slots filled if R > bLp
τ
L and may increase the revenue, which can be
calculated from expression (2.7). Nevertheless our framework is one of utility maximization: we assume the
platform is trying to assure its long-term revenue by producing as much benefit as possible for its users, its
advertisers and itself. There are, of course, several ways in which the platform could increase its own revenue
within the utility maximization framework: in the absence of competition from other platforms it could for
example charge an advertiser a fixed fee, less than the advertiser’s consumer surplus, to participate.
As yet a further example of the flexibility of the framework, instead of a fixed reserve price we could allow
an organic search result k to compete for a slot, with a positive benefit qτkl, but with bk = 0. Recent work
has analyzed the trade-off in objectives between the platform and advertiser in sponsored search: Roberts et al.
(2013) focus on ranking algorithms, trading off revenue against welfare, while Bachrach et al. (2014) also include
the user as an additional stakeholder. Our framework aims to maximize the aggregate social welfare of the
auction system, but it is noteworthy that this simple model of the benefit to a user of organic search results
can be subsumed within our framework.
7 Platform-wide optimization
An advertiser may judge some types of click-through as more valuable than others. In this section we suppose
that the platform allows an advertiser to express such preferences, by making distinct bids on different categories
of search query. The challenge for the advertiser is to balance her bids across the range of categories offered to
her by the platform.
Suppose the platform allows advertiser i to partition the type space T into categories (Tik : k ∈ Ki). The
categories may be defined in terms of the keywords used in a search or any other feature of the search type, such
as geographical area or broad classification of the user, that the platform is prepared to share with advertiser
i. We assume the platform allows advertiser i to know the category of the search type τ , namely that τ ∈ Tik,
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but the platform knows more, namely τ . We suppose the platform may vary aspects of the auction, such as the
number of advertising slots on the page or more generally the layout of the page, depending on the search type
τ . For example, the platform may use the current screen size of the user to determine the page layout.
Let bik be the bid of advertiser i for click-throughs from category k, and let bi = (bik : k ∈ Ki) and
b = (bik : i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki). Let yik be the click-through rate to advertiser i from searches in category k ∈ Ki, and
assume that the expected rate of payment by advertiser i for click-throughs from category k ∈ Ki is
πik(b)yik(b) =
∫ bik
0
(
yik(b)− yik(b
′
ik, b)
)
db′ik, i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki,
where (b′ik, b) is the vector obtained from the vector b by replacing the component bik by b
′
ik. This rate of payment
can be achieved by either of the first two pricing implementations of Section 2.2: these implementations use
the function yτi (b) to determine the charge for a click-through, and so no difficulty is caused by the form of the
auction depending upon the search type τ .
Let yi = (yik : k ∈ Ki). If advertiser i’s utility Ui(yi) is simply a sum of utilities Uik(yik) over the categories
k ∈ Ki then this model is subsumed in the model treated in earlier sections: advertiser i can be represented by a
collection of sub-advertisers, one for each category k ∈ Ki, and the platform can set click-through probabilities
to zero for sub-advertiser k ∈ Ki if τ /∈ Tik. But for more general utility functions we would expect that the
bids bik, k ∈ Ki, cannot be determined independently.
Suppose, then, that advertiser i’s utility Ui(·) is an increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable
function of the vector yi = (yik : k ∈ Ki). Assume that the partial derivative ∂Ui/∂yik decreases from ∞ to 0
as yik increases from 0 to ∞, and that bik 7→ yik(bik; b) satisfies the monotonicity property.
Let
U∗i (bi) = max
yi≥0
(
Ui(yi)−
∑
k∈Ki
bikyik
)
,
the Legendre-Fenchel transform of Ui(yi), interpretable as the consumer surplus of advertiser i at prices bi. Our
conditions on Ui and its partial derivatives ensure there is a unique maximum, interior to the positive orthant,
for any price vector bi in the positive orthant. Let (Dik(bi) : k ∈ Ki) be the argument yi that attains this
maximum: it is the demand vector of advertiser i at prices bi, and
∂
∂bik
U∗i (bi) = −Dik(bi). (7.1)
Then the question for advertiser i is how to balance her bids (bik : k ∈ Ki) over the categories Ki that are
of interest to her. The payoff to advertiser i arising from a vector of bids b = (bi : i ∈ I) = (bik : i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki)
is then
ui(b) = Ui(yi(b))−
∑
k∈Ki
πik(b)yik(b),
and the condition for a Nash equilibrium is again (4.2) where now bi is a vector. Paralleling the development
of Section 4, the maximum of the payoff function bi 7→ ui(bi, b−i) is attained when
∂
∂bik
U∗i (bi) + yik(b) = 0, k ∈ Ki,
or equivalently Dik(bi) = yik(b) for k ∈ Ki, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, and these conditions also identify
the unique system optimum.
Next suppose that for each k ∈ Ki advertiser i changes her bid bik(t) smoothly (i.e., continuously and
differentiably) as a consequence of her observation of her current click-through rate yik(b(t)) so that
d
dt
bik(t) ≷ 0 according as yik(b(t)) ≶ Dik(bi(t)). (7.2)
This is a dynamical system representation of advertiser i varying bik smoothly in order to increase or decrease
her bid for keyword k according to whether the currently observed click-through rate yik(t) is lower or higher
than her demand at her current bid prices. Then trajectories converge to the solution of the system problem,
by essentially the same Lyapunov argument as used to prove Theorem 2, as we now sketch.
Let
V(b) =
∑
i∈I
U∗i (bi) +
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈Ki
bikyik(b).
Differentiating V(b(t)) yields, from (7.1), Lemma 2 and (7.2),
d
dt
V(b(t)) =
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈Ki
∂V
∂bik
d
dt
bik(t) = −
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈Ki
(Dik(bi(t))− yik(b(t)))
d
dt
bik(t) ≤ 0
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where the inequality is strict unless Dik(bi(t)) = yik(b(t)) for i ∈ I, k ∈ Ki. But this holds if and only if y solves
the system problem.
Remark 3. Our approach to auction design separates the computational burden into a task that can be completed
quickly for each page impression by the platform, and tasks that can be performed more slowly by individual
advertisers or perhaps agents working on their behalf. The task for an advertiser is to assess the value to
her of different forms of click-through. This may not be an easy task, but it is a task naturally assigned to
the advertiser and is made simpler by requiring only local information in the region of the currently achieved
click-through rates.
Remark 4. How finely should a search platform allow categories to be defined, and how finely should it divide
its stream of queries across distinct auctions? Finer classifications will allow advertisers to communicate more
precisely their valuations but excessive targeting may lead to thinner markets and to various forms of adverse se-
lection. These trade-offs are discussed by Levin and Milgrom (2010), who argue that the degree of differentiation
allowed, or conflation imposed, is an important aspect of the organization of well-functioning markets.
In the current context, observe that advertiser i is forced to conflate her bid bik across multiple auctions,
and in each of these the set of competing advertisers is likely to be different. Thus the design of the categories
(Tik : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) provides ample opportunity to balance the degree of differentiation allowed to, or conflation
imposed upon, advertisers by the platform.
We end this section with two examples which indicate the connections between our work and earlier important
approaches in the traffic engineering and resource allocation literature.
Example 4. Consider a platform with advertisers who prefer click-throughs that come from one geographical
area rather than another, or from one set of keywords rather than another, simply because such click-throughs
are more likely to convert into sales. Then advertiser i’s utility will be a univariate function
Ui
( ∑
k∈Ki
wikyik
)
(7.3)
where we assume Ui(·) satisfies our earlier assumptions from Section 3 and where wi = (wik : k ∈ Ki) account
for the weight applied to each category by advertiser i.
Given that advertiser i declares a bid b˜i and weights w˜i = (w˜ik : k ∈ Ki) (strategically and not necessarily
equal to wi), the platform may use the information contained in w˜ as well as b˜ and τ to solve the revised
assignment problem, ASSIGNMENT(τ, b˜, w˜), defined as problem (2.1) with the revised objective:
Maximize
∑
i∈I
b˜i
∑
l∈L
w˜τi p
τ
ilx
τ
il,
where w˜τi = w˜ik for τ ∈ Tik and k ∈ Ki. Write bik = b˜iw˜ik and b = (bik : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I). then the model
formally reduces to that of this section. Essentially there are number of parallel auctions taking place with the
search type τ determining the bids of advertisers: if τ ∈ Tik then the bid of advertiser i is bik.
The reduction replaces the vector function Ui(yik : k ∈ Ki) by the special case (7.3), a univariate function of a
weighted sum. The utility (7.3) is concave but not strictly concave, and this introduces some minor technicalities
and some simplifications. When strategic advertisers maximize over (bik : k ∈ Ki) their respective payoff
functions
ui(b) := Ui
( ∑
k∈Ki
wikyik(b)
)
−
∑
k∈Ki
πik(b)yik(b)
the resulting Nash equilibrium is achieved under the necessary conditions
wikU
′
i
( ∑
k∈Ki
wikyik(b)
)
= bik, if yik(b) > 0, (7.4a)
wikU
′
i
( ∑
k∈Ki
wikyik(b)
)
≤ bik, if yik(b) = 0, (7.4b)
for k ∈ Ki and i ∈ I. In particular, (7.4a) implies that if yik(b) > 0 then wik/bik does not depend on k ∈ Ki:
hence the weights intrinsic to advertiser i, (wik : k ∈ Ki), and the weights declared strategically by advertiser i
to the platform, (w˜ik = bik/bi : k ∈ Ki), are in proportion wherever a positive click-through rate is received (this
is the simplification achieved by the form (7.3)). So the auction mechanism achieves incentive compatibility:
advertisers are encouraged to truthfully declare their intrinsic weights for categories for which they are competing.
We can interpret the system optimization as an infinitely large bipartite congestion game, an interpretation
that parallels one of Vickrey’s early motivations in transport pricing; in particular the conditions (7.4) parallel
the conditions for a traffic equilibrium in a network, Wardrop (1952), Beckmann et al. (1956).
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Example 5. An advertiser may have a budget constraint on what she can spend across different types of search,
for example, in an advertising campaign. In this example we note a simple approach which captures a budget
constraint within the framework of this section.
Suppose
Ui(yi) =
Bi
q
log
∑
k∈Ki
(wikyik)
q
for 0 < q < 1. Then
∂Ui
∂yik
=
Biw
q
ikyik
q−1∑
j∈Ki
(wijyij)q
and so at the unique Nash equilibrium described earlier in this section, where ∂Ui/∂yik = bik, the budget
constraint ∑
k∈Ki
bikyik = Bi
is automatically satisfied; note that the constraint is on the rate of bidding rather than expenditure, i.e., not
taking into account rebates.
We require q < 1 to ensure the strict concavity of Ui(·). As q → 1, maximizing Ui(yi) subject to the budget
constraint approaches the problem of maximizing
∑
k∈Ki
wikyik subject to the same budget constraint. In the
special case where all advertisers are budget constrained we recover an important early model for the equilibrium
price of goods for buyers with linear utilities, Fisher (1892); Eisenberg and Gale (1959).
Advertiser i will receive a stream of rebates, which may be delayed and will be noisy. Rebates will cause the
total spent in a period to be less than the budget Bi, and a natural control response would be to spread the total
rebate received in one time period over the budgets available for later time periods. Borgs et al. (2007) explore
a natural bidding heuristic for a budget-constrained advertiser which readily extends to include delayed rebates.
8 Related Work
In this paper we have considered a problem where the social welfare of an auction system is optimized subject
to the capacity constraints of that system. Social welfare optimization has long been an objective in the design
of effective market mechanisms, Vickrey (1961). However, only in the recent literature have computationally
efficient methods been considered for market and auction design, see Birnbaum et al. (2010), Jain and Vazirani
(2007), Vazirani (2010). In the context of electronic commerce and specifically sponsored search auctions, these
computational considerations are of critical importance given the increased diversity and competition associated
with online advertising.
We have applied a decomposition approach to the task of optimizing advert allocation over the vast range
of searches that can be conducted, and separated the task into sub-problems which can be implemented by
each advertiser and on each search. The decompositions of interest are familiar and have been important in the
context of communication network design, Srikant (2004); Kelly and Yudovina (2014). Tan and Srikant (2012)
is a distinct approach using optimization decomposition ideas, but based instead on a queueing model of an
on-line advert campaign and using connections to scheduling in wireless networks.
Strategic formulations of these optimization decompositions have been developed: in a simple model Johari and Tsitsiklis
(2004) show a price of anarchy of 75% at a Nash equilibrium. Notably, a single parameter VCG mechanism
to yield efficient allocation was considered by Maheswaran and Basar (2004) and subsequently generalized by
Yang and Hajek (2007) and Johari and Tsitsiklis (2009). Here a parametrized surrogate utility is employed in
the VCG mechanism, where the parameter is selected strategically. The message passed from the player to the
mechanism is thus chosen from a reduced space. One part of our decomposition can be viewed as deriving a
single parameter VCG mechanism with linear utilities; that is, despite allowing more general utility functions,
the derived mechanism is as if each player had a linear utility function. Prior works have used strictly concave
surrogate functions while in our approach linearisation is possible owing to the large search/constraint space
employed. A linear VCG allocation is computationally straightforward (Leonard (1983), Bikhchandani et al.
(2002)), but the crucial advantage of our linear framework is that – in addition to decomposing the objectives
of advertisers and the platform – further decomposition over the search space is possible, leading to a practical
mechanism. In particular, the mechanism can be implemented on each search instance: allocation and pricing
both involve standard polynomial time algorithms per-search and per-click, respectively. In essence, we find a
simple implementable auction mechanism that yields an efficient allocation of adverts across the entire search
space.
Parametrized VCG mechanisms are examples of simplified mechanisms, where the set of messages available
to report preferences is restricted. Milgrom (2010) has shown that the equilibria of a simplified mechanism are
also equilibria of the unrestricted mechanism when a certain outcome closure property is satisfied. The closure
property states that a bidder can make an optimal best response within the set of restricted bids whenever other
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bidders’ choices lie within the restricted set. As an example, the closure property can be applied to concave
utility functions under the restriction of linearity, with the restricted bid communicating a tangent plane rather
than the entire utility function.
A very common simplification applied in sponsored search auctions is conflation. For example advertisers
may be required to make the same bid per click whatever the position of an advert on the page. If advertisers
differentiate between positions beyond each position’s observed click-through rate (for example, if click-throughs
from lower positions are less or more valuable to the advertiser), then there may be a loss of social welfare from
the restriction that a bidder must communicate a single parameter to a mechanism which is unaware of these
positional effects. The question of whether VCG or GSP mechanisms with this restriction are sufficiently
expressive to communicate the bidders’ true values for positions is discussed in detail in Milgrom (2010) and
Du¨tting et al. (2011). Aggarwal et al. (2007) discuss mechanisms which maintain an efficient equilibrium by
allowing bidders to specify a minimum slot, in addition to their bid. Further recent discussions of simplified
mechanisms for sponsored search auctions are Chawla and Hartline (2013); Hoy et al. (2013); Du¨tting et al.
(2014).
The context in these papers is, in our terms, an auction for a single type of search. This context serves to
illustrate an important theoretical question concerning simplified mechanisms. The diverse stochastic variability
found in the sponsored search market (see Pin and Key (2011)) makes the assumption of a single type of search
unrealistic. The framework we adopt is rather different: we presume, as described in Section 2, that the search
platform knows more than the advertiser about the type of search being conducted, for example about the
searcher, and that this information affects click-through probabilities. For the advertiser there is therefore
a considerable further conflation: the same bid for a click-through is used over an entire category of search
query as well as over different positions. The information asymmetry between the platform and the advertisers
allows the platform to assign and price adverts using a per-search level of granularity on the search type, while
the advertisers experience only average click-through rates over a diverse set of search types. Our framework
is designed to model advertisers who differentiate the value of a click-through according to search categories,
defined in terms of keywords and user characteristics, rather than advert position: see Section 7.
Borgs et al. (2007) gave an important early treatment of the dynamics of bid optimization, and emphasised
the importance of equalizing the “return-on-investment” across keywords for budget-limited advertisers. These
authors also used a continuous time formulation, noted the importance of random perturbations, proved con-
vergence to a market equilibrium in the case of first price auctions and observed experimentally convergence in
the case of second price auctions. Auctions were all single slot, and bids were assumed truthful. The additional
contribution of Section 5 to this early work on dynamics is that we have established convergence for a wide
class of continuous time dynamics representing advertisers’ best response under our pricing mechanism.
More recent work on learning and bid optimization is reviewed by Tran-Thanh et al. (2014), who use the
framework of a multi-armed bandit to devise policies that maximize the expected number of click-throughs in
a given number of searches within a given budget. This stream of research typically uses no-regret learning,
expressing convergence in terms of sub-linear temporal convergence. Iyer et al. (2011) use a mean field approach
to treat agents who need the learn the value to them of a click-through. These are challenging problems, even
for the sequence of single slot second price auctions treated in these papers. By comparison our approach uses
a dynamical systems framework where fluid averages are controlled. We are also able to show convergence to
a Nash equilibrium, rather than a correlated equilibrium. Our approach deliberately simplifies the modelling
of the stochastic streams of click-throughs, which it represents with just their means, but is able to deal with
multi-slot auctions and with streams of click-throughs arising from different keywords and categories of searcher.
Nekipelov et al. (2015) review work on learning, focusing on a model of sponsored search auctions: their analysis
of data from BingAds indicates that typical advertisers bid a significantly shaded version of their value, as would
be expected in a generalized second price auction rather than a VCG auction.
As noted by Milgrom (2010), the most devastating objections to Vickrey pricing (Ausubel and Milgrom
(2006)) apply only when bidders can buy multiple items, and have no force in sponsored search auctions
where each bidder can acquire at most one position. Varian and Harris (2014) have recently argued that
VCG mechanisms are of practical interest because they are flexible and extensible. For this reason, Facebook
implements VCG2 rather than the generalized second price auction currently used by Bing and Google. These
considerations are particularly relevant for contextual advertisement, unordered page layouts, image-text adverts
and image-video adverts. Such extensions are important and are of growing interest to online advertisement
platforms; see Goel and Khani (2014) for a recent discussion.
9 Concluding Remarks
We describe a framework to capture the system architecture of Ad-auctions. The assignment problem must be
solved rapidly, for each search, while an advertiser is primarily interested in aggregates over longer periods of
2https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/pacing - downloaded on 20 August 2015.
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time. The platform knows more about the type of a search query and thus more about click-through probabilities,
while an advertiser knows more about the value to her of additional click-throughs and is incentivized to
communicate this information via her bids. Thus we model in detail each random instance of the assignment
problem, while we describe an advertiser’s strategic behaviour in terms of averages evolving in time. On a slow
time-scale the platform may decide which search types to pool in distinct auctions, across which the advertisers
will have different preferences they are able to communicate.
We have used sponsored search auctions as the motivation, and our model reflects current practice in
sponsored search, where platforms such as BingAds or Google Adwords use a variant of the second price
auction to solve the assignment and pricing problem for every search query, while advertisers alter bids on
timescales measured in hours or days. The setting, allowing for a large, continuous range of search types and
varying competition, greatly extends the scope of prior models which are typically limited to the auction of a
single keyword amongst a static pool of advertisers.
We address the task of achieving efficiency over all a platform’s searches under a pay-per-click pricing model.
Under the assumption of strategic advertisers, we showed that, with appropriate pricing, a Nash equilibrium
exists for the advertisers which achieves welfare maximizing assignments. We gave an appealingly simple way
to implement these prices: namely, by giving advertisers a rebate, constructed by solving a second assignment
problem. The first assignment is implemented with low computation cost and the solution to the second
assignment problem is not used for the allocation but only for pricing. Further this mechanism is found to be
flexible and extends in a straightforward manner to various different page-layouts. Hence under the pay-per-click
model, this mechanism shows potential to be adapted for use in current Ad-auctions.
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A Proof of Propositions 1 and Lemma 2
This section gives proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 concerning properties of the functions
yi(b) = Eτ
∑
l
pτilx
τ
il(b),
∑
i
biyi(b).
Proposition 1 requires the further technical lemma, Lemma 1, which give the Lipschitz continuity of a random
point belonging to a polytope as we smoothly change the description of its facets. Lemma 2 employs the
Envelope Theorem (Milgrom, 2004, Chap. 3), as is commonly applied in auction theory.
Lemma 1. 1) If U is a random vector uniformly distributed inside the unit sphere, Sn = {u ∈ R
n : ||u|| ≤ 1},
then there exist a constant K1 such that for any two non-zero vectors b, b˜ ∈ R
n\{0}
P(bTU ≥ 0 > b˜TU) ≤
K1
||b|| ∧ ||b˜||
||b − b˜||.
2) If X is a random variable with density fX continuous on its support P, a polytope P ⊂ [−1, 1]
n, then the
function P(µT1X ≥ 0, ..., µ
T
kX ≥ 0) is Lipschitz continuous as a function of µ1, ..., µk provided ||µ1||, ..., ||µk|| are
bounded away from zero.
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Proof. 1) We give a geometric proof of the result. We assume, wlog, that ||b|| ≥ ||b˜||, and we let Vn be the
volume of S. For every u satisfying bTu ≥ 0 > b˜Tu, there exists a θ ∈ [0, 1] such that bTu + θ(b˜T − bT)u = 0.
Let bθ be the unit vector proportional to b+ θ(b˜− b). So, b
T
θ˜
u = 0. Or, in other words, if bTu+ θ(b˜T − bT)u = 0
then u belongs to a cross section of the sphere {u′ ∈ S : bθu
′ = 0} for some bθ proportional to b+ θ(b˜− b). Thus
the volume of {u : bTu ≥ 0 > b˜Tu} is overestimated by the area of the sets {u′ ∈ S : bθu
′ = 0} multiplied by
the change in the normal vector bθ.
With this in mind we note three facts: 1) Each cross section {u ∈ S : bTθ u = 0} has the same volume Vn−1
in its n− 1 dimensional subspace; 2) The path P = {bθ : θ ∈ [0, 1]} is a circular path starting at b/||b|| and
ending at b˜/||b˜||, and thus has length bounded above by the terms
2π
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ b||b|| − b˜||b˜||
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2π||b˜||
∣∣∣∣b − b˜∣∣∣∣;
and, 3) {u ∈ S : bTu ≥ 0 > b˜Tu} = {u ∈ S : bTθ u = 0, θ ∈ [0, 1]}. Thus, we see we can bound the probability
P(bTU ≥ 0 > b˜TU) by the length of the path P times the volume of cross sections {u ∈ S : bTθ u = 0}. In other
words,
P(bTU ≥ 0 > b˜TU) ≤
2πVn−1
||b˜||
||b− b˜||,
as required.
2) A function which is componentwise Lipschitz continuous is Lipschitz continuous. So, without loss of generality,
we prove that the first component of our function is Lipschitz continuous. Observe∣∣∣∣∣∣P (µT1X ≥ 0, µT2X ≥ 0, ..., µTkX ≥ 0)− P (µ˜T1X ≥ 0, µT2X ≥ 0, ..., µTkX ≥ 0) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (µT1X ≥ 0 > µ˜TX,µT2X ≥ 0, ..., µTkX ≥ 0)− P (µ˜T1X ≥ 0 > µTX,µT2X ≥ 0, ..., µTkX ≥ 0) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤P
(
µTX ≥ 0 > µ˜TX
)
+ P
(
µ˜TX ≥ 0 > µTX
)
. (A.1)
Also since f is a continuous density on click-through probabilities P˜ , it is bounded by a constant. So, we can
bound the above probabilities with uniform random variables:
P
(
µTX ≥ 0 > µ˜TX
)
≤ K2P
(
µTU ≥ 0 > µ˜TU
)
for a constant K2 and for U a uniform random variable on the unit sphere in R
n. Now applying part 1) of this
Lemma
P
(
µTX ≥ 0 > µ˜TX
)
≤
K1K2
||µ|| ∧ ||µ˜||
||µ− µ˜|| ≤
K1K2
K3
||µ− µ˜||.
where K3 is the constant by which µ and µ˜ are bounded away from zero. Thus, applying this inequality to
(A.1), we have that P
(
µT1X ≥ 0, µ
T
2X ≥ 0, ..., µ
T
kX ≥ 0
)
is Lipschitz continuous in its first component and thus
is Lipschitz continuous.
The previous lemmas suggest that provided there is a certain amount of variability in pτij then we can expect
the average performance of an advertiser to be a continuous function of the declared prices b.
Proof of Proposition 1. First we argue the continuity of bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) and then argue that it is strictly
increasing and positive. We let S index the assignments that can be scheduled from I to L. Notice, provide
there is a unique maximal assignment,
xτil(b) =
∑
pi∈S:pi(i)=l
I
[∑
k
bkp
τ
kpi(k) ≥
∑
k
bkp
τ
kπ˜(k), ∀π˜ 6= π
]
=
∑
pi∈S:pi(i)=l
∏
p˜i 6=pi
I
[∑
k
bkp
τ
kpi(k) ≥
∑
k
bkp
τ
kp˜i(k)
]
. (A.2)
Here I is the indicator function. Notice, since Pτ admits a density, f(p
τ ), then with probability one there is a
unique maximizer to the problem ASSIGNMENT(τ, b). So the equality (A.2) holds almost surely for all b > 0.
For two assignments π and π˜, we define the vector
µpip˜i := (biI[π(i) = l]− biI[π˜(i) = l] : i ∈ I, l ∈ L) .
21
Notice for any two distinct permutations, the non-zero components of I[π˜(i) = l] are distinct. So the vectors
µpip˜i are distinct and non-zero over π˜ 6= π. Since the maximal assignment is almost surely unique, we have
xil(b) =
∑
pi∈S:pi(i)=l
E

∏
p˜i 6=pi
I
[∑
k
bkp
τ
kpi(k) ≥
∑
k
bkp
τ
kp˜i(k)
] = ∑
pi∈S:pi(i)=l
P
(
µTpip˜ip ≥ 0, ∀π˜ 6= π
)
. (A.3)
Thus if the function P
(
µTpip˜ip ≥ 0, ∀π˜ 6= π
)
is Lipschitz continuous then we have same properties for functions
xjl(b). The Lipschitz continuity of P
(
µTpip˜ip ≥ 0, ∀π˜ 6= π
)
is proven in Lemma 1. This implies the Lipschitz
property for xil(b) with b > 0 and since yi is a finite sum of these terms the same continuity holds for bi 7→
yi(bi, b−i), with b = (bi, b−i) > 0. Further, continuity at bi = 0 is also ensured by bounded convergence: there
are greater than |L| positive bids occur in b−i the assignment of these must eventually outweighs the assignment
of i as bi ց 0. In other words, (A.2) goes to zero point-wise as bi ց 0. Thus bounded convergence applies to
(A.3) and, also, yi(b) which implies yi(bi, b−i)→ 0 as bi ց 0.
We now prove that the function bi 7→ yi(bi, b−i) is strictly increasing for b−i 6= 0. First we show that it is
increasing. Since yi(b) = Eτy
τ
i (b) (2.2), if we can prove y
τ
i (b) is increasing then so is yi(b). Further note∑
i∈I
biy
τ
i (b) =
∑
i∈I,l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il(b)
which is the optimal objective for the assignment problem (2.1).
Define b′ with b′i < bi and b
′
j = bj for each j 6= i. We now proceed by contradiction. Suppose that
yi(b
′) > y(b), then the following equalities and inequalities hold∑
j∈I
bjy
τ
j (b) = (bi − b
′
i)y
τ
i (b) +
∑
j∈J
b′jy
τ
j (b)
≤ (bi − b
′
i)y
τ
i (b) +
∑
j∈J
b′jy
τ
j (b
′)
< (bi − b
′
i)y
τ
i (b
′) +
∑
j∈J
b′jy
τ
j (b
′) =
∑
j∈J
bjy
τ
j (b
′).
Here the first equality holds by the optimality of yτ (b′) and the second holds by assumption. But notice the
resulting equality above contradicts the optimality of yτ (b). Thus by contradiction, yτi (b) is increasing in bi
and, after taking expectations, so is yi(b).
We now prove that bi 7→ yi(b) is strictly increasing. Let b
′ be such that b′i > bi and b
′
j = bi for all j 6= i. The
result proceeds by showing that
P(yτi (b
′) > yτi (b)|E) > 0
where we condition on an event E with non-zero probability. Notice, after taking expectations, this implies that
yi(b
′) > yi(b).
Now since f(p) is positive on a region containing the origin, f(p) stochastically dominates a uniform random
variable on the set of increasing click-through rates, P˜ ∩ [0, ǫ]I×L, for some ǫ. Thus it is sufficient to prove the
result for u = (uil : i ∈ I, l ∈ L) uniform on P˜ ∩ [0, ǫ]
I×L. Now, for instance, there is positive probability that
advertiser i and j, with bj > 0, compete exclusively over the top two slots, l = 1, 2. This occurs, for instance,
when i and j have click-through rate over ǫ/2 and all other advertisers have expected revenue that is half of the
lower bound revenue of i and j, namely, the event
E :=

mink=i,j
l∈L
ukl ≥
ǫ
2
, 2 max
k 6=i,j
l∈L
{bkukl} ≤
ǫ
2
min{bi, bj}

 .
This event has positive probability and then only i and j can appear on the top two slots on this event.
Given this event, advertiser i achieves the top position with bid b′i and the second position with bid bi on
the condition
b′i(ui1 − ui2) > bj(uj1 − uj2) > bi(ui1 − ui2).
Since, after conditioning on E, ui1, ui2, uj1, uj2 remain independent and uniformly distributed (on the set
P˜ ∩ {ui1, ui2, uj1, uj2 ≥ ǫ/2}), it is a straightforward calculation that
P
(
b′i(ui1 − ui2) > bj(uj1 − uj2) > bi(ui1 − ui2)
∣∣E) > 0.
Since ui1, the value of y
τ
i achieved by b
′
i on E, is strictly bigger than ui2, the value of y
τ
i achieved by bi on E,
the above inequality implies
P(yτi (b
′) > yτi (b)|E) > 0,
and thus yi(b) < yi(b
′), as required. Further, note that this argument implies the required property that
yi(bi, b−i) > 0 for bi > 0.
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Lemma 2. The function b 7→
∑
i∈I biyi(b) is convex and continuously differentiable for b 6= 0; further,
d
dbi
{∑
i′∈I
bi′yi′(b)
}
= yi(b).
and
lim
||b||→∞
∑
i∈I
biyi(b) =∞. (A.4)
Proof. The optimal value of the assignment problem (2.1) is convex as a function of b, since it is the supremum
of a set of linear functions. Thus the function b 7→
∑
i∈I biyi(b), a linear combination of convex functions, is
also convex. Further
∑
i∈I biyi(b˜) is a supporting hyperplane at the point b˜. Differentiability can be shown to
follow from the continuity of y(b˜) as a function of b˜, and we next give a detailed proof following the Envelope
Theorem (Milgrom, 2004, Chap. 3).
Since by definition, xτ (b) is optimal for the assignment problem, we have that
∑
i∈I
biyi(b) = E
[∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il(b)
]
= E
[
max
xτ∈S
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il
]
,
Letting bh = b+ eih, where ei is the ith unit vector in R
I and h > 0 (a symmetric argument holds for h < 0).
We see that the partial derivative with respect to bi is lower-bounded
∑
i′∈I
bhi′yi′(b
h)− bi′yi′(b)
h
≥
1
h
{
E
[∑
i′∈I
∑
l∈L
bhi′p
τ
i′lx
τ
i′l(b)
]
− E
[∑
i′∈I
∑
l∈L
bi′p
τ
i′lx
τ
i′l(b)
]}
(A.5)
=E
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il(b)
]
= yi(b).
The inequality above holds because xτ (b) is suboptimal for the parameter choice bh. By the same argument,
applied to biyi(b) instead of bi′yi′(b) in (A.5), we also have that∑
i′∈I
bhi′yi′(b
h)− bi′yi′(b)
h
≤ yi(b
h).
ny the continuity of yi(b), letting h→ 0 gives that
d
dbi
∑
i′∈I
bi′yi′(b) = yi(b),
as required.
Since yi(bi, b−i) is non-zero for bi > 0 it follows that
min
||b||=1
∑
i∈I
biyi(b) > 0,
and consequently, letting ||b|| → ∞, we see that (A.4) holds.
B Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Proof of Proposition 2. A Lagrangian of the system problem (3.1a), (3.1b) can be written as follows
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi) +
∑
i∈I
biEτ
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il − yi
]
. (B.1)
Note that we intentionally omit the scheduling constraints from our Lagrangian, and therefore we must maximize
subject to these constraints, (3.1c-3.1d), when optimizing our Lagrangian.
Let A be the set of variables x = (xτ ∈ S : τ ∈ T ) satisfying the assignment constraints (3.1c-3.1e). We see
that our Lagrangian problem is separable in the following sense
max
x∈A
y,z∈RI+;
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− biyi} (B.2a)
+ Eτ
[
max
xτ∈S
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il
]
(B.2b)
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Here S denotes the set of x′ ∈ RI×L+ such that for each i ∈ I and l ∈ L∑
l′∈L
x′il′ ≤ 1, and
∑
i′∈I
x′i′l ≤ 1.
We now show that solutions x˜, y˜ and b˜ satisfying the Conditions A and B of our Proposition are optimal for
the Lagrangian (B.2a) and (B.2b) when b = b˜.
Firstly, suppose Conditions A and B are satisfied. Assuming Condition A, the following is a straightforward
application of Fenchel duality. If b˜i a solution to the optimization
minimize U∗i (bi) + biy˜i over bi ≥ 0,
then, under our expression (3.4) for U∗, the solution is achieved when Di(b˜i) = y˜i or equivalently when U
′
i(y˜i) =
b˜i. Thus it is clear that y˜i solves the optimization
max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− b˜iyi}.
Hence if Condition A is satisfied, then y˜i optimizes (B.2a) when we choose bi = b˜i.
Secondly, if x˜τ solves ASSIGNMENT(τ ,b˜) for each τ , because each maximization inside the expectation
(B.2b) is an assignment problem, then (B.2b) is maximized by x˜ when we take b = b˜.
These two conditions, Condition A and B, show that the Lagrangian (B.1) is maximized by x˜ and y˜ with
Lagrange multipliers b˜. In addition, x˜ and y˜ are feasible for the system optimization (3.1) and hence we have a
feasible optimal solution for this Lagrangian problem. But as we demonstrate in Proposition 5 below, Lagrangian
sufficiency still holds for the system problem (3.1) – despite the infinite number of constraints. Therefore we
have shown a solution to Conditions A and B is optimal for the system problem.
Conversely, we know that strong duality holds for the system optimization (3.1) – even with the infinite
number of constraints for this optimization (see Theorem 3 in the Appendix for a proof). Hence there exists
a vector b˜ such that an optimal solution to the system problem is also an optimal solution to the Lagrangian
problem when we chose Lagrange multipliers b˜. Thus, an optimal solution to the SYSTEM(U, I,Pτ ) must
optimize (B.2a) and (B.2b), and as discussed these solutions correspond to Conditions A and B. In other words,
an optimal solution to the system problem satisfies Conditions A and B with this choice of b˜.
Proof of Proposition 3. a) From Theorem 2, the Lagrangian of the system problem can be written as follows
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi) +
∑
i∈I
biEτ
[∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il − yi
]
. (B.3)
Recall from (B.2), this Lagrangian is separable and is maximized as
max
x∈A
y,z∈RI+;
Lsys(x, y; b) =
∑
i∈I
max
yi≥0
{Ui(yi)− biyi}+ Eτ
[
max
xτ∈S
∑
i∈I
∑
l∈L
bip
τ
ilx
τ
il
]
=
∑
i∈I
U∗i (bi) + Eτ
[∑
i∈I
bi
∑
l∈L
pτilx
τ
il(b)
]
=
∑
i∈I
(U∗i (bi) + biyi(b)).
In the second equality above, we rearrange the assignment optimization in terms of the click-through rate of
each advertiser, yi(b).
Thus the dual of this optimization problem is as required:
Minimize
∑
i∈I
[U∗i (bi) + biyi(b)] over bi ≥ 0, i ∈ I.
We analyze this dual problem. We first show that optimization (3.5) is minimized when 0 < bi < ∞ for
each i ∈ I. We consider the function ∑
i∈I
biyi(b).
With the technical lemma, Lemma 2, we see that this function is continuous and, for b−i 6= 0, differentiable with
ith partial derivative given by the continuous function yi(b). Further it satisfies (A.4). Thus since U
∗
i (bi) is a
positive function, we see that the dual minimization (3.5) must be achieved by a finite solution b∗. In addition,
by definition Di(b) = −(U
∗
i )
′(b) = (U ′i)
−1(b), and so the objective of the dual is continuously differentiable for
b > 0. Since Di(0) = ∞, the minimum of the dual problem (3.5) must be achieved by b
∗
i > 0 for each i ∈ I.
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Now, as the objective of (3.5) is continuously differentiable for b strictly positive, it is minimized iff for each
i ∈ I
dU∗i
dbi
(b∗i ) + yi(b
∗) = 0.
Finally, since each function U∗i is strictly convex, dual objective is strictly convex and so the above minimizer
is unique.
b) For the Lagrangian for the system problem, (B.3), Strong Duality holds by Theorem 3. So, there exist
Lagrange multipliers b∗, such that∑
i∈I
[
U∗i (b
∗
i ) + b
∗
i yi(b
∗)
]
= max
x∈A
y∈RI+;
Lsys(x, y; b
∗) = max
x∈A
y∈RI+;
∑
i∈I
Ui(yi)
where there are feasible vectors x∗, y∗ achieving the optimum of both maximizations above. By weak duality
it is clear that b∗ must be optimal for the dual problem (3.5). Further, since x∗ optimizes the Lagrangian Lsys
with Lagrange multipliers b∗, it solves the assignment problem, x∗τ = xτ (b∗).
C Lagrangian Optimization
In this paper, we consider optimization problems that have a potentially infinite number of constraints, in
particular, for the system-wide optimization (3.1). Thus it is not immediately clear that the Lagrangian approach
– ordinarily applied with a finite number of constraints – immediately applies to our setting. We demonstrate
that certain principle results, namely weak duality, the Lagrangian Sufficiency and strong duality, apply to our
setting. These technical lemmas supplement proofs in Propositions 2 and 3.
We consider an optimization of the form
Maximize g(y) (C.1a)
subject to yi ≤ Eµ[xi], i = 1, ..., n, (C.1b)
fj(x(τ)) ≤ cj , τ ∈ T , j = 1, ...,m, (C.1c)
over y ∈ Rn, x ∈ B(T ,Rn). (C.1d)
In the above optimization, we consider probability space (T ,Pµ) and measurable random variable x : T →
R
n. We let B(T ,Rn) index the set of Borel measurable functions from T to Rn. We assume that g : Rn → R
is a concave function and that fj : R
n → R is a convex function, for each j = 1, ...,m. We assume the solution
to this optimization is bounded above.
Although there are an infinite number of constraints in this optimization, we can define a Lagrangian for
this optimization as follows
L(x, y, z; b) = g(y) +
n∑
i=1
biEµ[xi − yi − zi] .
Here the Lagrange multipliers bi, i = 1, ...n, can be assumed to be positive, slack variables zi are added for each
constraint (C.1b) and the optimization of the Lagrangian is taken over yi real, zi positive and real, and xi a
Borel measurable random variable for i ∈ I. We let F be the set of (x, y) feasible for the optimization (C.1).
Weak duality and Lagrangian Sufficiency both hold for this Lagrangian problem.
Proposition 5 (Weak Duality).
a) [Weak Duality] For g∗ the optimal value of the optimization (C.1),
sup
y∈Rn,
x∈B(T ,Rn)
L(x, y, z; b) ≥ g∗.
b) [Lagrangian Sufficiency] If, given some b, there exists x∗ ∈ B(T ,Rn) and y∗, z∗ ∈ Rn that are feasible for the
optimization (C.1) and maximize the Lagrangian L(x, y, z; b) with z∗i := y
∗
i − Eµx
∗
i then x
∗, y∗, z∗ is optimal
for (C.1).
Proof. a) Because F is a subset of B(T ,Rn)× Rn, we have
sup
y∈Rn, z∈Rn+,
x∈B(T ,Rn)
L(x, y, z; b) ≥ sup
(x,y)∈F
z∈Rn+
L(x, y, z; b) = g∗.
This proves weak duality.
25
b) Now applying this inequality, if a feasible solution optimizes the Lagrangian, then
g(y∗) = L(x∗, y∗, z∗; b) = sup
y∈Rn, z∈Rn+,
x∈B(T ,Rn)
L(x, y, z; b) ≥ g∗.
Thus, (x∗, y∗) is optimal for (C.1).
For z ∈ RI , we use F(z) to denote the set of (x, y) satisfying constraints (C.1c-C.1d) and satisfying con-
straints
zi + yi ≤ Eµ[xi], i = 1, ..., n.
Note, F = F(0). We now show that there exists a Lagrange multiplier b∗ where the optimized Lagrangian
function also optimizes (C.1).
Theorem 3 (Strong Duality). There exists a b∗ ∈ Rn+ such that
max
(x,y)∈F
g(y) = max
y∈Rn
x∈B(T ,Rn)
g(y) +
∑
i∈I
b∗iE [xi − yi] . (C.2)
In particular, if there exist (x∗, y∗) ∈ F maximizing (C.1) then it maximizes (C.2).
Proof. Firstly, since F ⊂ B(T ,Rn)× Rn, we proved the weak duality expression
max
(x,y)∈F
g(y) = max
(x,y)∈F
g(y) +
∑
i∈I
b∗iE [xi − yi] ≤ max
y∈RI
x∈B(T ,Rn)
g(y) +
∑
i∈I
b∗iE [xi − yi] . (C.3)
So it remains to show the reverse inequality. We consider the following set
C = {(z, γ) ∈ RI × R : there exists (x, y) ∈ F(z) with g(y) ≥ γ}.
We claim that C is convex. Take (z0, γ0), (z1, γ1) ∈ C and take (x0, y0) ∈ F(z0), (x1, y1) ∈ F(z1) respectively
achieving bounds g(y0) ≥ γ0 and g(y1) ≥ γ1. For each term u = x, y, z, γ just defined, we correspondingly
define uq = (1− q)u0 + qu1, for q ∈ [0, 1].
By concavity of g, convexity of fj, j = 1, ...,m, and linearity, we have
g(yq) ≥ (1− q)g(y0) + qg(y1) ≥ γq,
fj(x
q(τ)) ≤ (1− q)fj(x
0(τ)) + qfj(x
1(τ)) ≤ cj ,
Eµ[x
q
i − y
q
i ] = (1− q)z
0
i + qz
1
i = z
q
i ,
for τ ∈ T , j = 1, ...,m and i = 1, ..., n. These above inequalities show that (zq, γq) ∈ C and thus our claim is
holds: C is convex.
Let γ∗ = max(x,y)∈F g(y). Here we are optimizing over F(z) with z = 0. So, it is clear that (0, γ
∗) does
not belong to the interior of C. Thus by the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem Rockafellar (1997), there exists
a hyperplane through (0, γ∗) supporting C. In other words, there exists a non-zero vector (b, φ) ∈ RI × R such
that
φγ∗ ≥ φγ + bTz,
for all (z, γ) ∈ C. Firstly, it is clear that φ ≥ 0, otherwise γ∗ is not maximal for (x, y) ∈ F .
We now claim φ 6= 0. We proceed by contradiction. If φ = 0, then 0 ≥ bTz for all (z, γ) ∈ C. But notice, for
any x ∈ B(T ,Rn+), we can choose yi ∈ R such that yi −Eµ[xi] = bi, thus for this choice of (x, y) we have z = b.
Thus, bTz = bTb > 0, and so we have a contradiction. It must be that φ > 0.
As φ > 0, we can define b∗ = (bi/φ : i ∈ I). Since for each (x, y) ∈ B(T ,R
n)×RI , if we set zi = Eµ [xi − yi]
and γ = g(y) then we have (z, γ) ∈ C. With this we have
max
(x′,y′)∈F
g(y′) = γ∗ ≥ γ + b∗Tz = g(y) +
∑
i∈I
b∗iE [xi − yi]
Thus, maximizing over x ∈ B(T ,Rn) and y ∈ RI , we have
max
(x,y)∈F
g(y) ≥ max
y∈Rn
x∈B(T ,Rn)
g(y) +
∑
i∈I
b∗iE [xi − yi] . (C.4)
Together (C.3) and (C.4) give the required equality (C.2). In addition, given (C.1) has a finite optimum,
inequality (C.4) can only hold when b∗ ≥ 0.
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